The skewness of the cross-sectional distribution of book-to-market ratios is shown to be an important state variable. It varies through time in correlation with the business cycle and with indicators of investor sentiment. When times are 'good' a tail of low book-to-market stocks causes a left skew in the distribution. In 'bad' times high book-to-market stocks make the distribution more symmetric. The variable is valuable for forming conditional expectations for returns on various long-short strategies. These include ones based on firm characteristics such as size, age, volatility, profitability and dividend payment, and ones based on book-to-market and momentum. It is also instrumental in predicting the excess return on the equal-weighted market portfolio. Significant predictive ability remains even when controlling for other proxies for investor sentiment and for macroeconomic conditions.
Introduction
There is a growing literature that identifies market-based proxies for times when markets are inflicted with excess investor sentiment, bullish or bearish. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) consider the discounts on close-end funds as such a proxy. Baker and Stein (2004) suggest that turnover or liquidity may proxy for sentiment in a market where individual investors face short-sale constraints. Most recently, Baker and Wurgler (2006) (BW) take an 'operational approach' and extract a first principal component from a number of such indicators to get a composite index.
One of the main findings of these papers is that sentiment has cross-sectional effects on mispricing and returns. That is, some stocks are more sensitive to speculative demand and therefore have prices that diverge more from their fundamental value when 'animal spirits' rise. For example, when investors are optimistic, stocks that are more difficult to value or arbitrage become relatively overpriced and subsequently have lower returns.
In this paper I show that the cross-sectional skewness of book-to-market ratios is a state variable that captures the cross-sectional effects attributed to investor sentiment. This variable's peaks coincide with bad sentiment periods, while its troughs correspond with good sentiment periods. The idea is that when sentiment hits the market some firms experience extreme divergence of prices from fundamentals while the bulk of stock prices are more closely aligned to their 'fair' value. In good times we are more likely to see outlier firms with extreme high price multiples, and in bad times we are more likely to see firms at 'fire sale' prices. Thus the shape of the cross-sectional distribution changes with sentiment. I show that cross-sectional skewness is correlated with some known market-based indicators of sentiment. In particular it is correlated with the BW sentiment index and with some of its components: The number of IPOs over the last year, the dividend premium and NYSE turnover. It is also correlated with survey-based indicators of sentiment, such as the Consumer Confidence Index and the American Association of Individual Investors' Bull minus Bear spread. Like other sentiment measures it is correlated with real economic growth variables, such as growth in industrial production and in employment.
Compared with the sentiment proxies mentioned above, the skewness measure has an advantage in that it is more general and does not take a stance on the nature of the stocks that are mispriced. This serves to its power as many of the other indicators are subject to structural changes that might make them obsolete. For example, the trend for disappearing dividends (Fama and French 2001) affects the value of the dividend premium as an indicator, and the shift of individuals' focus from closed-end to open-end funds undermines the closed end fund discount as a measure of sentiment.
The notion that when sentiment hits the market some firms may see an extreme divergence of prices from fundamentals is closely related to the work of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) on the limits of arbitrage. They show that professional arbitrageurs, who are held accountable by their own investors, can become ineffective in extreme situations when prices diverge far from fundamentals. This is in contrast to their ability to keep other stock prices aligned with fundamentals.
Shleifer and Vishny give the 1990-1991 period as an example. Stocks of commercial banks fell sharply. Arbitrageurs trying to eliminate the mispricing invested heavily in these high book-to-market stocks. But, since these stock prices kept falling they ended up losing most of their funds under management, and were forced to liquidate their positions. Thus they could not effectively prevent the mispricing. Correspondingly, I
show that the cross-sectional skewness spikes up during this period.
A good example of abnormally low cross-sectional skewness is the technology bubble.
In line with the limits to arbitrage argument, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) document that hedge funds did not exert a correcting force on tech stocks, but rather heavily invested in them. Growth stocks had high prices, while their book values were far from stellar, leading to a 'tail' of very low book-to-market ratios. This caused a negatively skewed distribution during 1999.
Previous papers use sentiment measures to predict returns of stocks that are harder to value or arbitrage. When sentiment is high these stocks are more likely to be overpriced and subsequently have low returns. When sentiment is low they are more likely to be underpriced and have a subsequent rebound. BW show that firm characteristics that proxy for difficulty in arbitrage or valuation can be used in a "conditional characteristics model." This means that future returns depend on such characteristics. The dependence, however, varies through time according to a state variable that measures sentiment. I show that the cross-sectional skewness can be used a state variable in such a model. Moreover, it remains significant when the BW index or its components are included in the model.
One possible characteristic that can be used in such a model is firm size. Small stocks are known to be prone to sentiment and to be harder to arbitrage. They are more costly to trade and sometimes impossible to sell short (D'Avolio 2002) . I indeed find that cross-sectional skewness predicts future returns on portfolios based on size. Specifically, it predicts monthly returns on the Fama-French SMB portfolio even when controlling for other known predictors, such as the risk-free rate, the term-spread and the default spread. The effect is not solely limited to the month of January and is robust to the inclusion of macroeconomic variables and investor sentiment proxies.
Returns of portfolios formed on other characteristics such as age, volatility, dividend payment and profitability are also predictable, even when controlling for the three FamaFrench factors and the momentum factor. The effect also persists when controlling for firm size and book-to-market directly rather than the linear factors. The direction of predictability is that high skewness leads to high returns for firms that are young, volatile, unprofitable or that do not pay dividends.
Following Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) I consider the idiosyncratic volatility of stocks as a proxy for the costs of arbitrage. I show that following low skewness (corresponding to good sentiment periods) firms with higher idiosyncratic volatility underperform those with low volatility, but following high skewness (corresponding to bad sentiment periods) they significantly outperform them. This is in line with the limits to arbitrage theory that such stocks become mispriced when sentiment reigns in the market.
Recent literature (Chordia and Shivakumar 2002 , for example) explores the relationship between momentum strategies and the business cycle. I contribute to the research by showing that expected returns on portfolios based on past performance, i.e. long-term reversal and short-term momentum, are correlated with the lagged skewness variable.
Long-term reversal strategies are most effective following high skewness periods ('bad sentiment') when losers show subsequent good returns. However, they are not effective following periods of low skewness ('good sentiment') when long-term losers continue to underperform.
Following low skewness periods, returns to short-term momentum strategies result almost solely from shorting losers, as last year's winners do not outperform the market.
Coming out of a 'bad' period short-term winners show strong momentum and the 'long' leg of the strategy is the profitable one. I investigate whether cross-sectional skewness predicts aggregate market returns. I find that like other sentiment indexes it predicts future excess returns on the equalweighted CRSP index. A one standard deviation increase in skewness predicts an increase of about five percentage points in the subsequent annual return of the index. However, the skewness is negatively correlated with future returns on the value-weighted index, and it does not predict it significantly.
The next section presents the main hypotheses of the paper. Section 3 introduces the data and the skewness measure. Section 4 looks at the cross-sectional and aggregate predictability using this variable. Section 5 concludes.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis I -Cross-sectional skewness of book-to-market ratios is correlated with 'sentiment' measures.
The first hypothesis is that the shape of the cross-sectional distribution of book-tomarket ratios changes through time. In periods when investors are bullish there is a left tail in the distribution and the skewness drops. When investors are bearish some stock prices get excessively depressed and the skewness rises.
Suppose investors are overly bullish about the market. Why would we expect their excess demand for stocks to alter the shape of the cross-sectional distribution of bookto-market ratios? I offer three explanations for why a group of stocks will get disproportionately overpriced and lower the skewness of the distribution. Mirror arguments can explain why a bear market will be related to high skewness.
First, investors tend to focus on certain types of stocks at different points in time for rational or irrational motives. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) propose that investors classify risky assets into 'styles,' and move funds back and forth into them as a group.
This can lead to circumstances where much of the excessive demand is directed at one style, causing it to be relatively mispriced. For example, "New Economy" stocks in the late 90s undoubtedly contributed to the cross-sectional skewness at that point.
Second, suppose investors are exposed to good news (signals) about stocks and they are overconfident about the precision of these signals. If they face fixed costs for trading on these signals, they only trade in the stocks for which they assess their potential profits to be higher than the costs. In that case only stocks for which signals are higher than a certain threshold become mispriced.
The third explanation is related to the limits of arbitrage. It could be that the rational arbitrageurs are the ones facing costs or limits to their arbitrage ability. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) consider professional arbitrageurs who manage other people's capital.
Such arbitrageurs identify opportunities, take contrarian positions in the mispriced stocks and wait for prices to move back to fundamentals. If prices of the assets in which they are invested diverge much further from fundamentals the arbitrageurs lose money, their investors withdraw funds and they are forced to liquidate their positions. Thus, in equilibrium, arbitrageurs prefer to avoid opportunities for which they expect mispricing to significantly worsen and they become most ineffective in extreme situations when prices diverge far from fundamentals. In up-markets we can expect 'extreme' overpricing situations and in down-markets 'extreme' underpricing situations.
Hypothesis II -Cross-sectional skewness is positively correlated with future returns on stocks that are more difficult to value or arbitrage.
As previously mentioned, sentiment indexes are instrumental in predicting conditional stock returns based on firm characteristics. Lee et al. (1991) consider small stocks because they are disproportionately held by individuals. BW consider a wider classification. They hypothesize that sentiment will affect stocks that are more costly to arbitrage or more difficult to value, and suggest young, small, volatile and unprofitable firms as such stocks.
A testable hypothesis is that skewness is positively correlated with future returns of small, young and volatile stocks. For example low skewness implies overvaluation and subsequent low returns for small stocks. In testing this hypothesis it is crucial to show that the effect is not driven solely by firms that have extreme book-to-market ratios, and to show that skewness predicts returns on small firms regardless of their book-to-market ratios.
Skewness is also hypothesized to predict the source of positive returns to long-short strategies like value and momentum. Following high skewness, high book-to-market stocks are expected to rebound, as are stocks that had the worst cumulative returns over the last five years. Following low skewness the value strategy shows good returns because of the short position in 'growth' stocks that under-perform the market, while high book-to-market firms will not outperform the median book-to-market firms.
Hypothesis III -Cross-sectional skewness is positively correlated with future excess returns on the equal-weighted market index.
Since skewness positively predicts the returns on small firms it is expected to positively predict the returns on the equal-weighted CRSP index and negatively predict, if at all, returns on the value-weighted index. This is because the mispriced stocks are expected to be under-weighted in the value-weighted index.
3 Data and Methodology 3.1 Construction of the Cross-Sectional Skewness Variable, SKEW bm
The main variable used in this paper is the cross-sectional skewness of log book-tomarket ratios (SKEW bm.) I use data from COMPUSTAT and CRSP to construct it.
Each period skewness is measured as:
where bm i,t is the log of the book-to-market ratio of firm i at time t. bm t = In an unreported analysis I use the time-series that is based on annual COMPUSTAT data, where firms' book-to-market ratios are calculated using the convention of Fama and French (1992) . That is, I match book values for fiscal year-ends in calendar year t − 1 to market values from July t to June t + 1. The series includes additional years of data, but has large discontinuities every twelve months. Most of the results remain similar to those reported here with the quarterly series. Previous papers, such as Kothari and Shanken (1997) , document that aggregate bookto-market ratios, like the DJIA aggregate book-to-market ratio, have pronounced trends and are close to unit root. Skewness has a lower one-lag serial correlation, 0.90. The augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic is -3.96, rejecting non-stationarity at p-value 0.01.
Returns and Characteristics Data
The empirical tests center on the relationship between stock returns and firm characteristics. The accounting data for these are taken from the annual COMPUSTAT database. I follow Fama and French (1992) and match accounting data for fiscal year-ends in calendar year t − 1 to monthly returns from July t to June t + 1.
Size, M E, is the market equity of the firm computed as price times shares outstanding from CRSP. Firm size from June of year t is matched to returns from July of year t to June of year t + 1. Age is the number of years since the firm's first appearance on CRSP.
Volatility, σ, is the standard deviation of monthly returns over the twelve months ending in December of year t − 1, and is matched to returns from July of year t to June of year t + 1.
Earnings, E, are defined as income before extraordinary items plus income statement deferred taxes minus preferred dividends. The profitability dummy, E > 0, takes a value of one if earnings are greater than zero. ROE is zero for unprofitable firms and is equal to E/BE for profitable firms, where BE, is shareholders' equity plus deferred taxes.
Dividend to equity, D/BE, is determined from COMPUSTAT as dividend per share at ex date times share outstanding divided by book equity. A firm is a dividend payer, D > 0, if COMPUSTAT reports positive dividend per share by the ex date.
Two proxies for asset tangibility are considered following BW: property, plant and equipment over assets, P P E/A, and research and development expense over assets, RD/A, when it is positive. Table 1 .
Sentiment Indicators
The closed-end fund discount, CEFD, is the average difference between the net asset values of closed-end stock fund shares and their market prices. Prior work suggests it is inversely related to sentiment. It is not significantly correlated to SKEW bm. However, papers like Qiu and Welch (2004) already show that it has lost its correlation to investor sentiment in later periods.
NYSE share turnover is based on the ratio of reported share volume to average shares listed on NYSE. The variable, TURN, is defined as the natural log of the raw turnover ratio, detrended by the five-year moving average. According to Baker and Stein (2004) turnover or liquidity may proxy for sentiment in a market where individual investors face short-sale constraints. It is negatively correlated to SKEW bm as expected.
The number of IPOs in the last year, NIPO, is correlated to SKEW bm. This is expected if more firms IPO when multiples for comparable firms are relatively high.
Mechanically, if IPOs tend to have low book-to-market ratios then their appearance in the cross-section can cause a left skew. To control for such an effect I also construct a measure of skewness that includes only firms with more than one year of observations in CRSP. The results throughout the paper still hold. The average first-day returns on last year's IPOs, RIPO, has a lower correlation with SKEW bm.
The equity share in new issues, S, is defined as gross equity issuance divided by gross equity plus gross long-term debt issuance using data from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. I do not find it to be correlated with SKEW bm. The last of these proxies is the dividend premium, PDND, which is the log difference of the average market-to-book ratios of payers and nonpayers. It is significantly correlated with SKEW bm.
In sum, SKEW bm is correlated with a number of market-based sentiment indicators.
It is most highly correlated with the dividend premium and the number of IPOs. It is also significantly correlated with the BW sentiment index. Throughout the paper I would like to determine the effects of SKEW bm that are not captured by this index. To accomplish this, I use the residuals from a monthly contemporaneous regression of SKEW bm on the index as an explanatory variable.
I also consider the correlation of SKEW bm to measures formed directly from investor surveys. Qiu and Welch (2004) consider the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index as a measure of investor sentiment. This measure is available in monthly intervals since 1978.
I find that SKEW bm has a significant -0.14 correlation with that index, while the series differences have a -0.17 correlation.
The American Association of Individual Investors' (AAII) sentiment survey measures the percentage of individual investors who are bullish, bearish, and neutral on the stock market short term. These individuals are polled from the AAII Web site on a weekly basis. SKEW bm has a significant 0.18 correlation with the monthly average of the bull minus bear spread measure of that survey.
Macroeconomic Conditioning Variables
Chen, Roll and Ross (1989) and Ferson and Harvey (1999) document that macroeconomic variables that predict aggregate stock and bond returns through time also provide significant cross-sectional explanatory power for stock portfolio returns. I therefore look at the relationship between SKEW bm and some of these variables.
The first is the dividend price ratio, DPR, which is the difference between log of the S&P 500 and the sum of dividends paid over the previous twelve months. Since sentiment is expected to be related to the equal-weighted portfolio, I also look at EBM, the equal-weighted average of book-to-market ratios of CRSP firms. Skewness is highly correlated with EBM, but has a negative correlation with DPR. These correlations are hard to interpret because the aggregate price ratios have pronounced trends whereas the skewness does not. The negative correlation with the S&P 500 ratio indicates that skewness is driven by smaller firms, which are better represented in the equal-weighted portfolio.
Next I consider three bond-related variables, which are known to capture the macroeconomic state. The first is the three-month treasury bill, TBL. It is taken from the 3-month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate series of the economic research data base at the Federal Reserve Bank at St. Louis (FRED). The two others are the default yield spread, DFY, which is the difference between BAA-and AAA-rated corporate bond yields, and the term spread, TMS, which is the difference between the long-term yield on government bonds and the T-bill.
I also control for three direct measures of the real activity in the economy: an indicator of recession as defined by NBER, growth in employment which is defined as the log growth in Total Seasonally-Adjusted Nonfarm Employment from the BLS Web site, and growth in Industrial Production from the Federal Reserve Board G.17 release.
As can be seen in Table 1 , SKEW bm is negatively correlated with growth in employment and growth in industrial production. Also, some of its identifiable peaks in Figure   1 , like 1991 and 2001, correspond to NBER recessions.
Econometric Approach
The paper aims to relate SKEW bm to overvaluation or undervaluation of certain stocks.
In particular, it focuses on predicting the returns due to the correction of such mispricing.
To allow for a reversal pattern I look at the relationship between monthly stock returns and one-year lagged SKEW bm. As an alternative I also consider predictive regressions for long-term portfolio returns with lengths of twelve to sixty months.
Two regression approaches are used. One is a conditional characteristics model as in BW, where monthly returns on portfolios based on firm characteristics are predicted by one-year lagged SKEW bm. A typical regression model is of the following form The contemporaneous controls are returns on the factors of a four-factor model. They include RMRF, SMB, HML and UMD. RMRF is the excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio. SMB is the return on a portfolio long small firms and short big firms controlling for book-to-market. HML is the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market firms minus that of low book-to-market firms controlling for size. UMD is the return on high momentum minus low momentum stocks, where momentum is defined over months [-12,-2] . Returns are taken from Ken French's Web site and the construction of the portfolios is described there. SMB is not included as an explanatory variable when it is the dependant variable.
I also control for sentiment indicators contemporaneous with SKEW bm. I do so by replacing SKEW bm in some regressions with SKEW bm ⊥ , which is the time series of residuals from the regression of SKEW bm on Baker and Wurgler's monthly sentiment variable from Wurgler's website.
The second econometric approach follows Ferson and Harvey (1991) . It tests whether cross-sectional premia for certain characteristics or factor loadings are predictable. In the first stage I run a cross-sectional regression each month of the form:
R e i,t is the excess return on a stock or a portfolio. X i,t−1 is either a firm characteristic known prior to time t, or a factor loading calculated using information prior to time t. γ t is a vector of premia in the cross-section for the components of X i,t−1 . In the second stage I regress components of γ t on SKEW bm t−year to see whether the crosssectional relationship between returns and the components of X i,t−1 is predictable using the skewness measure. This regression is of the form:
I run these regressions for several stock characteristics controlling for size and bookto-market in the cross-section.
4 SKEW bm and the Investment Opportunity Set
Future Performance of Book-to-Market Portfolios
The relationship between firms' book-to-market ratios and their expected stock returns is one of the most thoroughly examined topics in finance. Papers such as Fama and French (1992) document the positive returns for portfolios long on stocks with high book-to-market ratios and short low book-to-market firms. There is a debate about whether these returns are compensation for risk (Fama and French 1993, for example) or mispricing (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 1994 , for example), but for most part the relationship is assumed to be uniform across the cross-section.
In this section I explore if SKEW bm can predict whether future returns to the value strategy will result from good performance of value stocks or bad performance of growth stocks. The hypothesis is that when there is skewness to the left, low book-to-market firms are due to have subsequent low returns. When skewness is to the right, high book-to-market firms are expected to have high returns.
I break down the period of 1970-2004 into low skewness periods defined as the lowest quartile, mid-skewness periods, which fall in the interquartile range, and the highest quartile of skewness periods. Table 2 shows that following low instances of SKEW bm most of the value premium is due to the lower performance of the low book-to-market deciles versus the mid-range deciles. Following high SKEW bm it is due to the better performance of the high book-to-market portfolios. The different states, however, do not show a difference in the total value spread.
This suggests that the value strategy of buying high book-to-market and selling low book-to-market, can be broken down to high minus mid, and mid minus low. The performance of the former should be positively related to skewness, while that of the latter should be negatively related to it. To test this, I form monthly portfolios by NYSE deciles of book-to-market from 1971-2005. Two strategies are constructed: an equalweighted portfolio of the top three deciles minus that of the mid four deciles, and an equal-weighted portfolio of the mid four deciles minus that of the lowest three deciles. Table 3 shows the results of running the regressions for predicting the portfolios with one-year lagged SKEW bm. The regression equations are:
The regression is run once without controls. Then, I control for the three Fama-French factors and the momentum factor. The results suggest that such a reversal relationship does exist, and that SKEW bm predicts each portion of the value spread even when controlling for concurrent HML. The coefficient is still significant for the High-minusNeutral portfolio when SKEW bm is orthogonalized with respect to the BW sentiment index. But, it loses significance for the Neutral-minus-Low portfolio in that case.
Returns to Size-Based Portfolios
Sentiment is hypothesized to have an effect on the relationship between returns and firm size. Small firms have been mentioned in the past as harder to arbitrage and more prone to investor sentiment (e.g. Lee et al., 1991) . The goal of this section is to verify whether the skewness of the cross-sectional distribution of book-to-market ratios is instrumental in forming expectations about the future performance of firm-size based strategies.
To assess the relationship between SKEW bm and the cross-sectional premium for size I use the cross-sectional premium approach as previously defined. I consider equalweighted returns on twenty five portfolios based on ME and BE/ME from Ken French's Web site as the cross-section. I use the portfolios in two Fama-MacBeth settings, one in which I estimate the slopes on the size and book-to-market characteristics and the other where I measure the risk premium or the slope on betas with each of the Fama French
factors. An unreported analysis using the value-weighted returns of the portfolios yields similar results.
First, each month I run the cross-sectional regression in equation (6). Table 4 reports the mean and the Fama-MacBeth t-stat for the full sample and for the subsamples as described in the previous section. The size coefficient is only negatively significant following the high SKEW bm period. It is positive but insignificant following the low period. The difference in means between these two periods is 0.43 and is significant at 0.01.
I run a regression for the coefficient on size versus previous year's SKEW bm.
Results are given in Panel B of Table 4 . T-stats are based on White (1980) (Newey-West errors have similar p-values.) SKEW bm is significant in predicting the cross-sectional coefficient for size.
As an alternative to the characteristic-based specification, I perform Fama-MacBeth type regressions where in each cross-section portfolio returns are regressed on their betas with each of the Fama-French factors. Betas are calculated using monthly data for the previous five years. The coefficients in these regressions are estimates of the crosssectional risk-premia for each of the factors. The results are reported in Table 5 .
The ANOVA t-test for difference in means for λ SM B between periods following high and low SKEW bm is significant at 0.01. Positive loading on SMB earns a significant positive premium only after high SKEW bm. During the period when the premium on SMB is significant, the premia on the two other factors are not. The premium on RMRF increases with SKEW bm, which is an indication that high skewness (correlated with 'bad' sentiment) is associated with higher expected market premium. Like other studies, however, this premium is found to be negative in a three-factor model. The premium on HML disappears following high skewness indicating that size might be more effective in explaining the cross-section of expected returns coming out of a 'bad' period.
To quantify the effect on returns and control for other predictors of SMB, I run a regression of the monthly portfolio returns on one-year lagged SKEW bm. The results are in Table 6 . In a univariate regression, SKEW bm is significant in predicting SMB at 0.01 level. The economic magnitude of the effect is that one standard deviation increase in SKEW bm predicts an additional 0.5 percentage point per month return on the SMB portfolio.
The cross-sectional skewness remains significant even when the one-year lagged log of the equal-weighted mean of book-to-market ratios is included. It is also significant when additional bond related variables are added. These variables are lagged only one quarter. They are the t-bill, the term spread and the default spread. The skewness is still significant when additional macroeconomic variables are added. These are growth in industrial production, growth in employment and an NBER recession dummy. Furthermore, SKEW bm remains significant when orthogonalized with respect to the BW sentiment index.
Results for Size Controlling for Book-To-Market and Past Performance
In order to verify that SMB predictability is not due to extreme growth or value firms, I perform the time series regression controlling for book-to-market quintile. Panel A of Table 7 considers five regressions. One-year lagged SKEW bm is the regressor in all of them. The dependent variable is one month return for a portfolio of the smallest quintile of firms in a given book-to-market quintile minus the return on the largest quintile of firms in the same book-to-market quintile. Portfolios and returns are from Ken French
Web site.
The regressions show that results are not driven just by stocks of the extreme quintiles in book-to-market and predictability is across-the-board. Although the coefficients are slightly higher for the lowest and highest book-to-market quintiles. As in previous cases, the significance and magnitude of the SKEW bm coefficient is not materially altered when the monthly BW sentiment index is included in the regression.
A different concern is that the predictive results are related to the long-term reversal effect documented by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) . They show that contrarian strategies which are long past long-term losers and are short past long-term winners earn abnormal returns. Panel B of Table 7 considers five regressions where the dependent variable is one month return for a portfolio of the smallest quintile of firms in a given long-term reversal quintile minus the return on the largest quintile of firms in the same long-term reversal quintile. The long-term portfolios are formed monthly on prior (13-60) returns.
Return breakpoints are based on NYSE quintiles. Portfolios and returns are again taken from Ken French's Web site.
The regressions show that the predictability of small-minus-big by SKEW bm is not merely a long-term reversal effect. SKEW bm predicts the returns of small-minus-big in each long-term quintile. The coefficient is however largest and most significant when past long-term losers are considered.
Although there is no clear reason why the results would be driven by short-term momentum, the last panel in Table 7 shows that the predictability of size portfolios is not driven by short-term momentum. The method is similar to that used to control for long-term reversal.
Long-Run Analysis
The previous analysis looked at monthly returns with a fixed lag of one year after the measurement of SKEW bm. A one-year lag may not be the correct time-frame to capture the reversal effect. In this subsection I perform time-series prediction analysis for returns on the SMB portfolio of varying lengths. Log returns of SMB over twelve to sixty months are regressed on the one-month lagged skewness variable. In Panel B of the table the one-year regression is reported with controls for other predictors. SKEW bm remains highly significant. The controls include the equal-weighted mean of log book-to-market ratios of the same universe of firms as that included in SKEW bm. Also included in the regression are the first principal measure of BW and its components.
Although the BW index predicts SMB by itself, this predicting ability disappears when SKEW bm is included. In the presence of SKEW bm the number of IPOs and the dividend premium remain significant in a regression that includes all six components.
These controlled regressions indicate that SKEW bm, although correlated with known market-based indicators, still provides new information for predicting small stock returns.
Similar results hold when I use the BW method of using end-of-year values of the marketbased indicators to predict monthly returns throughout the year.
SKEWbm and Firm Characteristics
Stock characteristics other than size may also help identify stocks that are more susceptible to sentiment or that have higher costs of arbitrage. These characteristics will identify the stocks that will be overpriced during the periods of high sentiment, and underpriced when there is low sentiment. Therefore, if we condition on sentiment, we can use them to predict subsequent reversal patterns. To test whether this is the case I look at the predictability of their cross-sectional 'premia.' I first run monthly cross-sectional regressions of the form:
and
Char is one of the following: an indicator whether the firm paid dividends, an indicator whether it was profitable in the previous fiscal year, the firm's age (years in CRSP)
or the ratio of R&D to Assets in the last fiscal year.
I then run a second stage regression: Since SKEW bm has been standardized to have zero mean the intercept represent the full sample means of the βs from the first stage. Dividend payers and profitable firms do not significantly underperform or outperform the other firms in the full time-series sample.
But their performance relative to non-payers and non-profitable firms improves as the skewness decreases. For example, one year after high sentiment period (characterized by SKEW bm equal to mean minus one standard deviation) the future performance of payers is expected to be 0.54 percentage points per month higher than non-payers.
Following low sentiment (characterized by SKEW bm equal to mean plus one standard deviation) payers are expected to underperform non-payers by 0.86 percentage points per month. Some of the significance of the effect as well as its magnitude decrease when size is included in the cross-sectional regressions.
I further explore the role of conditional pricing by looking at predicted returns of portfolios based on equal-weighted portfolios of High minus Low values of various firm characteristics as in equation (1). The 'High' portfolio includes firms in the top three deciles based on NYSE breakpoints, and the 'Low' portfolio includes firms in the bottom three deciles based on NYSE breakpoints. Table 10 considers the predictability for portfolios based on a number of characteristics that have previously been identified as related to difficulty in valuation or arbitrage.
When skewness is high, young, volatile, non-earners and non-payers are expected to outperform. This is significant even when controlling for the three Fama-French factors and the Momentum Factor. They are also significant when SKEW bm is orthogonalized with respect to the BW index.
Returns on portfolios formed on proxies for asset tangibility, i.e. PPE/A, and R&D/A are also predictable. But, the predictability disappears when controlling for the contem-poraneous factors. High skewness, i.e. bad sentiment, predicts good returns on low PPE/A and high R&D/A firms.
Future Returns and Costs of Arbitrage
Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) suggest that a stock's costs of arbitrage can be measured as the historical variance of a zero-net-investment portfolio that holds one dollar long in the stock and one dollar short in a portfolio of substitutes. They consider either the market portfolio or three stocks matched by industry, size and book-to-market as substitutes and show that for the 259 stocks in their sample the methods yield highly correlated results. Since I have to estimate costs for the entire cross-section and over a longer period, I opt for the market approach and use CAPM idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for arbitrage risk.
Idiosyncratic volatility, ivol, is calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals in the regression of the excess stock return versus the excess market return. Every month, I
use the previous five years to estimate each stock's idiosyncratic volatility as the standard deviation of i,t in equation (12).
Next, I form ten monthly portfolios by ranking the stocks according to their idiosyncratic volatility. Figure 4 shows the equal-weighted average returns in excess of the market of these portfolios. The three lines represent months following low SKEW bm shows that following positive skewness high volatility stocks will perform better than low volatility stocks, and vice versa following negative skewness. A limits to arbitrage argument would be that during the high sentiment period which drove the low skewness, high ivol stocks became overpriced because arbitrageurs could not undo the mispricing.
Since the hypothesis is about the time-series of the cross-sectional slope of returns versus idiosyncratic volatility I use the Fama-MacBeth framework to test it. Each month in the sample of 1971-2005, I run a cross-sectional regression of the excess stock return on the idiosyncratic volatility. Stocks with less than five years of data are excluded. Every month the regression in equation (13) is estimated.
To show the correlation to lagged SKEW bm, the sample is first broken down to three periods according to lagged SKEW bm and a test for the difference in means is conducted. Table 11 considers the sample and subsamples and provides the mean and Fama MacBeth t-stats for the intercept and the slope of the volatility. The full sample coefficient on ivol is not significant. Following low skewness the coefficient on ivol is negatively significant at 0.10. Following high skewness the coefficient is positive. The difference in means of 0.14 is significant at 0.01.
I next consider the 420 observations of lagged SKEW bm and β iv and run a regression using White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust errors as in equation (14).
SKEW bm predicts the sign of the relationship between ivol and returns when controlling for book-to-market in the cross-sectional regressions and when controlling for both book-to-market and firm size. In unreported regressions, including the BW sentiment index as a control variable does not alter the magnitude or the significance of the SKEW bm coefficient.
Predicting the Effectiveness of Momentum and Reversals
In this section I investigate the relationship between SKEW bm and the subsequent return profiles for two strategies based on relative past performance: long-term reversal (De Bondt and Thaler 1985) and short-term momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) .
I wish to expand on previous papers that show that the returns to portfolios formed on past performance vary with the business cycle. Ball, Kothari and Shanken (1995) point out that positive returns on long-term reversals are mostly due to good performance of losers and occur predominantly after down markets. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) show that returns to short-term momentum vary through the business cycle and can be explained by a set of lagged macroeconomic variables.
I first turn to long-term reversals and show that positive returns to the strategy indeed follow high SKEW bm periods. This is shown in Figure 2 . It shows the returns to each of the long-term reversal deciles following three SKEW bm periods: low SKEW bm ('good period'), mid SKEW bm, and high SKEW bm ('bad period'). The ten equal-weighted decile portfolios are based on long-term past returns (13-60) where breakpoints are set by NYSE firms.
The figure supports the Ball et al. (1995) findings. Following periods of high skewness losers outperform winners. In fact, there is a monotonic relationship along the deciles.
On the other hand following periods of low skewness losers do not perform as well as winners. Namely, firms that underperformed during periods of good sentiment go on to underperform rather than to experience reversal.
To verify the significance of the effect, I consider a regression of the long-term reversal factor, which measures the returns to a long-term reversal strategy, on SKEW bm. The factor returns are taken from Ken French's Web site. It is based on six value-weighted portfolios formed on size and prior (13-60) returns. The portfolios, which are formed monthly, are the intersections of 2 portfolios formed on size and 3 portfolios formed on prior (13-60) return. Breakpoints are based on NYSE percentiles. The factor is the average return on the two low prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two high prior return portfolios.
I find that returns to the reversal strategy significantly increase with SKEW bm even when controlling for the January effect and for the four factors. (1985) suggest, then it is overreaction to bad news rather than good news. The presence of such overreaction can be detected by the form of the cross-sectional distribution of book-tomarket ratios.
I now turn to the short-term momentum strategy. Although the short-term momentum strategy seems to be profitable on average in all periods. Figure 3 provides evidence about the source of the profits for this long-short strategy. Every month ten equal-weighted portfolios are formed based on stocks short-term past returns (2-12). As in Figure 2 , the monthly returns are grouped into three periods according to the lagged SKEW bm variable. Portfolios and monthly returns are taken from Ken French's website.
While on average both sides of the long-short strategy contribute to the returns, it appears that coming out of a bad period (i.e. high SKEW bm) continuing relative outperformance of winning portfolios are the source of the positive returns. On the other hand, subsequent to low SKEW bm periods momentum profits are mostly due to the continuing underperformance of losers relative to the average.
To verify the significance of these results I use a regression framework where I predict the excess monthly returns of the short-term top decile, i.e. winners, over the market, and the excess returns of the market over the short-term bottom decile, i.e. losers. SKEW bm predicts both of those spreads significantly. It remains so when the four-factors including momentum are included and when it is orthogonalized to the BW index.
The magnitudes implied by the regressions are not small. One standard deviation increase in SKEW bm leads to a 0.73 percentage points increase in monthly excess return of the winner portfolio over the market. One standard deviation decrease in SKEW bm leads to 1.05 percentage points increase in the spread of the market over the loser portfolio.
The findings support a notion that momentum should not be seen as a monolithic strategy. In a recuperating economy its source is in certain stocks that see runs of positive returns. This is in line with the limits to arbitrage argument that some stocks were more mispriced during the down market, but also requires that the correction will not be instantaneous but take about a year. At other times, like during a collapsing bubble, positive returns are a result of certain stocks seeing runs of negative returns.
Aggregate Predictability
Lastly, I explore whether SKEW bm predicts aggregate market returns. The evidence on several sentiment indicators is that they predict the equal-weighted market index better than value-weighted one (Baker and Wurgler 2007) . This is because small stocks are more affected by sentiment. The effect on large stocks might sometimes be contrary to general sentiment as funds flow to-and-from the speculative smaller stocks.
I investigate whether SKEW bm can forecast the excess returns of the CRSP equalweighted portfolio over the risk-free rate. Predictive regressions for the log excess return over periods of one to five years are run. The dependent variable is the level of SKEW bm at the end of the previous month. Standard errors are calculated using Newey-West with q=K-1.
The results in Table 12 show that SKEW bm does predict the equal-weighted excess return. The coefficient is significant even after five years. The R-squared and the t-stats increase until three years and then drop. A one standard deviation change in SKEW bm predicts a 5.4 percentage points change in annual excess return for the equal-weighted portfolio over the next twelve months. This prediction falls to 3.3 annual percentage points for the five-year horizon.
On the other hand Panel B of Table 12 shows that SKEW bm is negatively correlated to future long-term excess returns on the value-weighted CRSP portfolio. Coefficients are for the most part not significant.
Conclusion
In this paper I identify the skewness of the cross-section of book-to-market ratios as an important state variable. I demonstrate that it captures facets of the data that in other papers are attributed to sentiment. The variable is correlated with real macroeconomic variables as well as known sentiment indicators. Specifically, in expansionary times the cross-sectional distribution of book-to-market ratios shows a left tail. During recessions this distribution is close to symmetric.
These findings are in line with the theory of limits to arbitrage, which predicts that while most stocks might be 'correctly' priced, at certain times particular stocks might display extreme mispricing. I.e. mispricing is not a smooth continuum but rather is concentrated in a subset of difficult to arbitrage stocks. When investor sentiment is positive extremely mispriced stocks are expected to be over-priced, and when investor sentiment is negative severely mispriced stocks are expected to be under-priced.
This paper suggests that the cross-sectional relationship between expected returns and book-to-market ratios varies through the business cycle. At times, the value premium is due to low performance of low book-to-market firms, and at others it is due to good performance of high book-to-market firms. Therefore, papers, such as Cohen, Polk and Voulteenaho (2003) , that estimate the 'average' linear relationship over time between book-to-market ratios and future returns, might in fact be missing some of the effect of investor sentiment on the cross-section of book-to-market ratios.
Previous literature on sentiment identifies patterns of returns based on firm characteristics that are related to the difficulty in arbitrage or in valuation. I show that the cross-sectional skewness captures these return patterns. For one, it predicts the returns on the Small Minus Big portfolio. It does so even when other known predictors are included in the regression. It also predicts returns on portfolios based on age, volatility, profitability and dividend payment controlling for size.
A prediction of the theory of the limits to arbitrage is that firms for which costs of arbitrage are higher will be more prone to mispricing. Following the literature I consider idiosyncratic volatility as a measure of difficulty in arbitrage. After periods of high cross-sectional skewness the more volatile firms outperform the less volatile ones. But, subsequent to periods of low skewness the volatile firms significantly underperform the less volatile ones. Panel A considers SKEW bm, the cross-sectional skewness of book-to-market ratios, and other conditioning variables. It uses monthly observations between 1970-2004. DPR is the difference between the log of the S&P 500 and the log of dividends paid over the previous twelve months. TBL is the three-month treasury bill. DFY is the difference between BAA and AAA-rated corporate bond yields. TMS is the difference between the long term yield on government bonds and the T-bill. DEMP is log growth in Total Seasonally-Adjusted Nonfarm Employment from the BLS. DIP is growth in Industrial Production from the FRB. EBM is the equal-weighted average of book-to-market ratios of CRSP firms. Panel B considers sentiment indicators taken from Baker and Wurgler (2006) . Data are taken from Jeff Wurgler's Web site. PDND is the log ratio of the value-weighted average market-to-book ratios of payers and nonpayers. NIPO is the annual number of IPOs. RIPO is the average annual first-day returns of IPOs. TURN is detrended log turnover, which is the ratio of share volume to average shares listed on NYSE detrended using the past five-year average. CEFD is the value-weighted average discount on close-end mutual funds. S is gross annual equity issuance divided by gross annual equity plus debt issuance. SENT is the first principal component of the six sentiment proxies as calculated in Baker and Wurgler (2006 
Panel B considers the Neutral minus Low strategy:
The SKEW bm variable is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. In each of the panels the regression (1) is a univariate regression. Regression (2) and (4) include controls for the four factors. Regressions (3) and (4) The table reports Fama-MacBeth regressions where the assets are 25 portfolios based on size and BE/ME. Each month the following regression is run:
Panel A considers the time-series average coefficients for the full sample and then a split on the one-year lagged SKEW bm measure: lowest quartile, inter-quartile and highest quartile over the period The table reports Fama-MacBeth regressions where the assets are 25 portfolios based on size and BE/ME. Factor betas are calculated using 5-year rolling regressions, and then each month, the following crosssectional regression is run:
The first line considers the full sample mean and Fama-Macbeth t-stats, and then a split by the lagged SKEW bm measure measure: lowest quartile, inter-quartile and highest quartile over the period . The last line considers the difference in means between high and low periods. * * * , * * and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The table reports regressions for predicting one-month return of the Small-Minus-Big as defined by Fama and French (1993) . The regressors are one-year lagged SKEW bm and controls, which are a dummy for January, one-year lagged equal-weighted book-to-market ratio (EBM), term spread (TMS), T-bill (TBL), default spread (DFY The table reports fifteen regressions. One-year lagged SKEW bm is the regressor in all of them. It has been standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. In Panel A the dependent variable is one month return for a portfolio of smallest quintile of firms in a given book-to-market quintile minus the return on the largest quintile of firms in the same book-to-market quintile. In Panel B the dependent variable is one month return for a portfolio of smallest quintile of firms in a given long-term reversal quintile minus the return on the largest quintile of firms in the same long-term reversal quintile. In Panel C the dependent variable is one month return for a portfolio of smallest quintile of firms in a given short-term momentum quintile minus the return on the largest quintile of firms in the same short-term momentum quintile. The monthly size, book-to-market, prior (13-60) return, and prior (12-2) return breakpoints are NYSE quintiles. Portfolio allocations and returns are from Ken French Web site. * * * and * * denote significance at the 1% level and 5% level respectively. or R e it = β 0,t + β ch,t · Char i,t−1 + β BM,t · log(B/M ) i,t−1 + β M E,t · log(M E) i,t−1
for columns with † . Char is whether the firm paid dividends or was profitable in the previous fiscal year, its age (years in CRSP) or R&D / Assets in the last fiscal year. The sample includes monthly returns between 1971-2005. The second stage regression is β ch,τ = γ 0 + γ SK · SKEW bm τ −year * * * , * * and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. SKEW bm has been standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Every month two equal-weighted portfolios are formed based on NYSE decile breakpoints for a number of firm characteristics. The long-short portfolio is long the 'High' and short the 'Low' which correspondingly include firms in the top three and bottom three deciles. The table reports results for regressions of the long-short portfolio returns on lagged SKEW bm: (1) by itself, (2) controlling for the Fama-French factors (RMRF, SMB and HML) and a momentum factor (UMD), (3) controlling for the Baker and Wurgler Sentiment Index, (4) Controlling for the Four Factors and the Sentiment Index.
Pay Div Pay Div
R H,t − R L,t = β 0 + β SK SKEW bm t−year + γ · Controls t + t
The sample period includes monthly returns from 1971 to 2005. The firm characteristics are age, volatility, ROE, profitability (E > 0), dividend payment (D > 0), fixed assets (P P E/A) and research and development (RD/A). The Table provides R i,t = β 0,t + β iv,t ivol i,t−1 + β BM,t log(B/M i,t−1 ) + i,t
First the full sample mean and t-stat are reported and then a split on the one-year lagged SKEW bm measure. The bottom line reports the difference in means between Hi and Lo periods. Panel B considers a time-series regression of the cross-sectional coefficient on ivol on lagged SKEW bm. The first column considers a cross-sectional regression as in Panel A with only ivol and log(B/M) as regressors. The second column also includes size in the cross-sectional regressions, and the third includes beta as well.
The SKEW bm variable is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. * * * , * * and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The table considers regressions for predicting log excess returns on the equal-weighted CRSP portfolio over periods of one to five years using SKEW bm at the end of the previous month. Panel B considers regressions for predicting log excess returns on the value-weighted CRSP portfolio. The SKEW bm variable is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. * * * , * * and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
